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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KOREA: LEGALLY COPING
WITH PAST WRONGS AFTER DEMOCRATIZATION
Kuk Cho†
Abstract: For more than a decade, Korean society has taken various legal steps to
rectify past wrongs perpetrated by the old authoritarian-military regime. In 1995, the
“Special Act Concerning the May 18 Democratization Movement” was passed in the
National Assembly. Under this new legal circumstance, the two former presidents were
imprisoned on charges of leading the 1979 military coup and brutally oppressing the May
18 Uprising of 1980. However, because such a transition from the authoritarian-military
rule was established through a political compromise, Korean society had to experience a
limited transitional justice. As another step to rectify past wrongs, the “Act for Restoring
the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for
Them” was enacted in 2000. Under this Act, a number of democratization activists have
been recognized as “democratization movement involvers.” However, this Act has been
strongly criticized because the activists using harsh counter-violence were also
recognized as the “involvers.” In 2001, the legislature enacted the “Special Act for
Truth-Finding Suspicious Deaths” to handle the suspicious deaths of many
democratization activists during the old authoritarian-military regime. Also, broadening
the scope of illustrating past wrongs, a series of laws was recently enacted to uncover the
activities of pro-Japanese collaborators under the Japanese occupation in the early
twentieth century.
These various Special Acts for dealing with past wrongs certainly have never been
free from political struggle between the liberal and conservative. Some argue that these
acts were forged by agreements between these two factions. However, although each
side has advocated somewhat differently, they have come together in the belief that
Korean society needs to discard the legacy of the authoritarian regime. In this light, the
acts are symbolic statements that officially declare the people’s dissatisfaction with the
authoritarian regime. Therefore, they are necessary for Koreans to heal old wounds, and
to move beyond their tortured past.

I.

INTRODUCTION

For more than a decade, Korean society has taken legal steps to rectify
past wrongs under the authoritarian-military regime. A cleansing campaign
has developed since the “Civilian Government” was launched in 1993. It
was a part of a global wave of political democratization after soviet
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communism’s collapse.1 The nationwide “June Struggle” of 1987 led to the
collapse of Korea’s authoritarian-military regime and opened a road toward
democratization. Since then, a number of human rights violation cases were
shockingly revealed in Korea (“Korea” or “South Korea”). The Korean
public came to see the whole picture of the painful past, and it became an
unavoidable task for the Korean democratic-civilian governments to rectify
past wrongs. How to properly achieve “transitional justice” has become a
serious political and legal issue. 2 While liberals including human rights
organizations supported the realization of transitional justice, conservatives,
in particular politicians with military backgrounds, objected to it.
This Article aims to review the legislative steps and the judicial
decisions regarding Korea’s dark past, and to provide a Korean method to
deal with past wrongs. First, this article reviews the constitutionality of the
1995 Special Act Regarding the May 18 Democratic Movement, which was
enacted to suspend the statute of limitations in order to punish the crimes
committed by military leaders on and around December 12, 1979 and May
18, 1980. Second, this article proceeds to examine the recent laws excluding
application of the statute of limitations to state crimes against human rights
and related issues of retrospective punishment. Third, it reviews two bills
intended to restore the honor of democratization activists, and to find the
truth about suspicious deaths that occurred in the process of the
democratization movement against the authoritarian-military regime: the
2004 Act for Restoring the Honor of the Democratization Contributors and
Compensation for Their Sacrifice, and the 2000 Special Acts for Finding
Truth about Suspicious Deaths. Finally, to extend the scope for rectification
of past wrongs, this article briefly examines three recently enacted laws: the
2004 Special Act for Finding the Truth of Anti-Nation Activities under the
Japanese Occupation, the 2005 Special Act for Reverting the Property of
Those Who Did Pro-Japanese Anti-Nation Activities to State, and the 2005
Basic Law for Coping with Past History for Truth and Reconciliation.

1

Regarding the global situation of lustration of the past wrongs, see TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
(A. James McAdams ed. 1997); Mark S. Ellis, Purging the Past:
The Current State of Lustration Laws in the Former Communist Bloc, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181,
181 (1997); THE POLITICS OF MEMORY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN DEMOCRATIZING SOCIETIES (Alexandra
Barahona de Brito et al. eds., 2001).
2
“Transitional justice” is defined as the conception of justice associated with periods of political
change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.
See Guillermo O'Donnel & Phillippe C. Schmitter, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 6 (1998); Ruti G. Teitel, Transtional Justice Genealogy,
16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003).
THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES
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II.

TWO FORMER PRESIDENTS WERE PUNISHED

A.

Punishing the Leaders of the Military Coup3

1.

The Civilian Government Was Initially Hesitant to Punish Military
Leaders

581

The task of coping with past wrongs started with the punishment of
military leaders, including two former presidents, Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh
Tae-Woo. They led the December military coup of 1979 after the
assassination of President Park Chung-Hee, and ordered the brutal
oppression of the May 18 Uprising of 1980 in the Kwangju area. Chun
became President after dissolving the National Assembly and revising the
Constitution under martial law. Roh was elected as president by popular
referendum in 1987.
The “Civilian Government” that President Kim Young-Sam launched
in 1993 faced strong demands from the public to investigate and punish
these military leaders. Under the previous Roh government, redefining the
Uprising as a “democratization movement,” the National Assembly passed a
law that allowed for victim compensation, 4 and made Chun appear and
testify in parliamentary hearings. However, these efforts did not alleviate
the people’s demands for justice and a full inquiry into the two historical
incidents. In its inception, the Kim Young-Sam government was hesitant to
pursue punishment against the two former presidents because he entered the
Blue House with support from many politicians with military origins.
Although President Kim strongly criticized the military leaders and praised
the May 18 Uprising of 1980, he was reluctant to resort to criminal
punishment, "arguing that the truth should be reserved for historical
judgment in the future."5
In 1994, the Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office made a controversial
decision to suspend prosecution of the military leaders although it
recognized that the December coup of 1979 involved crimes of mutiny,
insurrection, and murder, and the suppression of the May 18 Uprising of
3
See generally James West, Martial Lawlessness: The Legal Aftermath of Kwangju, 6 PAC.RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 85 (1998); In Sup Han, Kwangju and Beyond: Coping with Past State Atrocities in South Korea,
27 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 998 (2005).
4
Kwangju minjuhwa undong kwanryeonja bosang deung e kwanhan beopryul [Act for
Compensation for the Victims in the Democratization Movement in Kwangju], Statutes of S. Korea, Law
No. 4266 of 1990) (last revised by Law No. 7911 of 2006).
5
Han, supra note 3, at 1005.
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1980 constituted treason and murder. They were concerned that prosecuting
the military leaders might cause political, social, and legal confusion
because, legally speaking, the democratic-civilian government was a legal
successor to the previous Chun and Roh governments. Therefore, they
concluded that “a victorious coup should not be punished after a substantial
lapse of time.” 6 The office was faced with a “dilemma between formal
legality and substantive justice, or between normative reality and a
normative ideal.”7
In 1995, the majority opinion of the Constitutional Court held that this
prosecutorial decision did not exceed the prosecutorial discretion allotted in
Article 247 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and was, hence,
constitutional.8 The court held that the statute of limitations automatically
ceases during the incumbencies of the former presidents according to Article
84 of the Constitution.9 Article 84 provides: “The President shall not be
charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of office except for
insurrection or treason.”10 This meant that Chun and Roh could be subject to
prosecution for mutiny or homicide. However, the court believed that it did
not need to intervene into the prosecutorial decision, considering the
conflicting interests between realizing justice by punishing the military
leaders, and prolonged social confrontation caused by doing so.11
2.

The 1995 Special Act Regarding the May 18 Democratization
Movement Presented a Legislative Move to Punish the Perpetrators

The Korean public was not satisfied with this compromised legal
solution and kept pressing the government and the legislature to make a new
law to punish the military leaders. Students demonstrated in the street
demanding punishment of Chun and Roh. The newly revealed scandal that
the two former presidents had amassed huge amounts of money from bribes
they had received during their presidency made people even more infuriated.
It became certain that Korean people did not want to leave their crimes to
the judgment of history but to seek a legal response to the crimes. In
response, President Kim directed his ruling party to enact new legislation
6

5.18 beop jeok chaekim kwa yeoksa cheok chaekim [MAY 18, LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND
HISTORICAL EVALUATION], 225-27, 243-44 (Park Eun-Jung & Han In-Sup eds. 1995).
7
Han, supra note3, at 1010.
8
Decision of January 20, 1995, 94 HunMa 246 (Korean Constitutional Court). See also Decision of
December 15, 1995, 95 HunMa 221, 95 HunMa 233, 95 HunMa 297 (Korean Constitutional Court).
9
Decision of January 20, 1995, 94 HunMa 246 (Korean Constitutional Court) at 5-Ka-(2)-(Da).
10
See Daehan minguk heonbeop [The CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA], art. 84 (last
amended 1987), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/welcome01.jsp.
11
Decision of January 20, 1995, 94 HunMa 246, supra note, 8 at 5-Da.

JUNE 2007

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KOREA

583

and the National Assembly passed the Special Act Concerning the May 18
Democratization Movement in December 1995.12
The Special Act was enacted to suspend the statute of limitations for
the crimes against constitutional order which had been committed on and
around December 12, 1979 and May 18, 1980. 13 It stipulated that the
limitation period ceased to run during the period of the presidencies of Chun
and Roh in which “there existed obstacles for the State to institute
prosecution.”14 It also allowed the court to review prosecutorial disposition
of cases where a prosecutor had declined to prosecute.15 On the other hand,
a right to have a special retrial was given to people who had been punished
because of their engagement in the May 18 Uprising or because of their
opposition to crimes against the constitutional order.16
In these new legal circumstances, the Seoul District Prosecutor’s
Office initiated prosecution and detained the two former presidents and
former high-ranking officials who led the 1979 military coup and oppressed
the May 18 Uprising of 1980.
B.

Judicial Decisions Allowed the Case to Go Forward

During the trial, the constitutionality of the 1995 Special Act was
challenged by the defense. The defense argued that the Special Act was
made to punish only specific groups, and, therefore, arbitrarily violated the
equal protection principle. In addition, it applied retrospective punishment
and, thus, violated the ex post facto principle. However, the Constitutional
Court confirmed the constitutionality of Article 2 of the Special Act in
1996.17
First, the Constitutional Court held that the Special Act cannot be
regarded as automatically unconstitutional even though it was narrowly
created for particular situations. The Special Act can be justified by other
reasonable grounds: that the unlawfulness of the coup was grave and there
exists national demand to rectify the past wrongs in the aim of establishing
legitimate constitutionalism.18
Second, the court held that the Special Act does not violate the ex post
facto principle. The court based its decision on two hypothetical situations
12
5.18 Kwangju minjuhwa undong deung e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act Concerning
the May 18 Democratization Movement], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 5029 of 1995.
13
Id. art. 2(1).
14
Id.
15
Id. art. 3.
16
Id. art. 4.
17
Decision of February 16, 1996, 96 HunKa 2, 96 HunBa 7 & 13 (Korean Constitutional Court).
18
Id. at 3-Ka-(3).
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because the Supreme Court at that time had not decided the issue of whether
the statute of limitations expired when the Special Act was applicable. It
held that if the statute of limitations had not expired it would be
constitutional to extend the statute of limitations. The justices’ opinions
were split in the case as to whether the statute had already expired.19 Four
justices maintained the Special Act was still constitutional, while five
justices argued it was unconstitutional. 20 However, the vote of five
dissenting justices did not meet the requirement for a decision of
unconstitutionality, which requires a vote of six or more.
On April 17, 1997, the Supreme Court affirmed the defendants’
convictions for treason and killing for the purpose of treason. 21 The
Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for the crimes against
constitutional order was lawfully suspended by the Special Act, and the
prosecution was instituted before the period expired.22 It held:
The defendants grasped political power after they stopped the
exercise of the authority of constitutional state institutions by
mutiny and rebellion. Even if they had arguably ruled the State
based on the Constitution which was revised by popular
referendum, it should not be overlooked that a new legal order
was established by mutiny and rebellion. It cannot be tolerated
under any circumstances under our constitutional order to stop
the exercise of the authority of constitutional state institutions
and grasp political power by violence, not following democratic
procedure. Therefore, the mutiny and rebellion can be
punishable.23
Chun was sentenced to life imprisonment and Roh was imprisoned for
seventeen years. Others received prison sentences ranging from three and a
half to eight years. Based on Article 7 of the Special Act,24 the decorations
given to the military leaders were cancelled in 2006.25
19

Id. at 3-Da & Ra.
Id. at 3-Na.
21
Decision of April 17, 1997, 96 Do 3376 (Korean Supreme Court).
22
Id. chapt. 1 (2)-Ka.
23
Id. chapt. 1 (1).
24
5.18 Kwangju minjuhwa undong deung e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act Concerning
the May 18 Democratization Movement], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 5029 of 1995, art. 7.
25
Park Joong-Hyun, [Disgraced Ex-Presidents Lose State Honors], CHOSUN ILBO (S. Korea), Mar.
22, 2006; Sung Dong-Ki, [Former Presidents Stripped of Medals], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Mar. 22,
2006; Kim Hak-Joon, [The Decorations Awarded to Former Presidents Canceled] HANKYOREH SHINMOON
(S. Korea), Mar. 21, 2006; Chun Su-jin, [Ex-Presidents Stripped of All Decorations, Orders of Merit],
JOONG-ANG ILBO (S. Korea), Mar. 22, 2006.
20
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The Successful Prosecution and Trial Were “Collective Lessons in
Justice”

Transitional justice in Korea did not sacrifice justice although the Kim
Young-Sam government was established with support from many politicians
with military origins. The government had to consider the people’s power
that overthrew the old regime. The trial of the military leaders declared that
military coups and dictatorships will never be tolerated in Korea. It was a
symbolic break with the old regime, providing education about democracy
and the rule of law. In this context, the trial of the military leaders was a
“political theatre” to provide “collective lessons in justice.”26
After the guilty verdict, the military leaders, including two former
presidents, received presidential pardons and were released in 1997.
Nobody expected they would fully serve their sentence. Investigation and
prosecution for other inferior soldiers or government officials who served
for them were not pursued. The fact that the transition from the
authoritarian-military regime was not established through revolution, but
rather through compromise, embracing some parts of the political forces that
had backed the authoritarian-military regime, constituted the restrictive
surroundings for transitional justice. In this sense, justice was limited.
III.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS CAN PREVENT THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS LAWS

A.

There Are Legal Difficulties When Punishing State Crimes Because of
Statutes of Limitations

Although two former presidents and other former military leaders
were punished, a number of governmental officials or agents who tortured
citizens, distorted substantial facts to convict citizens, and even murdered
citizens, remain unpunishable. The Presidential Truth Commission on
Suspicious Deaths, which was established in 2001, 27 recognized their
crimes. However, they were not prosecuted because the given period in the
statute of limitations had expired. According to the Criminal Procedure
Code, crimes such as murder are subject to statutory limitations of only

26

Barahona, supra note 1, at 26.
Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of 2005).
Regarding the activities of the Truth Commission, see text accompanying notes 80-91.
27
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fifteen years. 28 This short period of statutory limitation is a major
impediment to legal redress.
Besides the “suspicious death”29 cases that occurred in the process of
the democratization movement, there was a notorious case where state
authorities hid and supported a killer in order to maintain an anti-communist
ideology and to bolster the authoritarian regime.
Kim Ok-Boon, also known as Susie Kim, was killed in Hong Kong by
her husband in 1987. Her husband, Yoon Tae-Sik, lied to law enforcement
authorities including the Agency for National Security Planning (“ANSP”),
which was formerly the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (“KCIA”), that
she was a spy for North Korea, had kidnapped him with other spies, and that
he had escaped from them. Even though they found Yoon to be lying, the
ANSP announced that Kim was a spy and praised Yoon as an anticommunist fighter. In 2001, after democratization, the truth was revealed
and Yoon was arrested and convicted. In May 2002, Kim’s family filed a
civil suit against the state and, in August 2003, was given 4.2 billion won
(equivalent to approximately 0.4 million U.S. dollars) as compensation in a
court decision. The Seoul District Court held that the state cannot rely on
the statute of limitations if it has not taken any action to correct the illegal
activities by state authorities.30
However, the ANSP agents who fabricated and concealed the truth
could not be prosecuted because the statute of limitations period for their
crimes had expired. The public was angered by such legal technicalities
preventing the punishment of criminals. Civic organizations and human
rights groups strongly argued for the establishment of a law to prosecute
them. However, like American jurisprudence, 31 the majority of Korean
jurisprudence maintains that retrospective application of an amended
limitation period to time-barred prosecution violates the ex post facto
principle because it may invite arbitrary and oppressive exercise of state
authority to punish and infringes upon the citizen’s expectation of being free

28
Hyeongsa sosongbeop [The Korean Criminal Procedure Code], Act No. 341, Statutes of S. Korea,
art. 249. (1954) (last revised by Law No. 7965 of 2006).
29
Id. art. 2.
30
Kim Soo-Kyung, [4.2 Billion Won Paid to Suzy Kim’s Family], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Aug. 15,
2003; Yang Sung-Wook, [Suzy Kim’s Family Won the Lawsuit Against the Government] DONG-A ILBO (S.
Korea), Aug. 15, 2003.
31
Commonwealth v. Guimento, 491 A.2d 166 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); People v. Shedd, 702 P.2d 267
(Colo. 1985); State v. Hodgson, 740 P.2d 848 (Wash. 1987); State v. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska
1988); State v. Nunn, 768 P.2d 268 (Kan. 1989); Commonwealth v. Bargeron, 524 N.E.2d 829 (Mass.
1989); Commonwealth v. Rocheleau, 533 N.E.2d 1333 (Mass. 1989); People v. Chesebro, 463 N.W.2d 134
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Cookman, 920 P.2d. 1086 (Or. 1996).
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from punishment. By contrast, extending a limitation period before a given
prosecution is barred does not violate this principle.32
As seen in the decision of the Constitutional Court on the
constitutionality of the 1995 Special Act Concerning the May 18
Democratization Movement in December 1995, 33 Constitutional Court
justices’ opinions were also split on whether the retrospective extension of
the statute of limitations was constitutional when the limitation period had
already expired.
B.

Legislative Efforts to Overcome Statute of Limitations Bars to
Prosecutions

There have been two bills submitted to cease or exclude the
application of the statute of limitations.
The first was the 2002 Bill for Revision of the Criminal Procedure
Code. 34 It excluded the application of the statute of limitations to the
following crimes: treason, inducing of foreign invasion, killing or inflicting
injury by torture, killing of civilians by war crimes or terror, destruction of
evidence, helping criminals flee, abandoning duty, perjury, and interference
in the performance of public duty with the intent of concealing facts.35 It
also provides that the statute of limitations shall cease while a criminal is
staying out of the country to evade prosecution, or during any period the
case is being concealed or fabricated.36 However, the bill did not pass in the
National Assembly.
The second bill was the 2005 Special Act Bill for Statutory
Limitations to the State Crimes against Human Rights. 37 It excludes the
application of the statute of limitations to killing or torture by state
authorities in both criminal and civil cases.38 It provides that the statute of
limitations shall cease for the crimes of destruction of evidence, illegal arrest
and detainment, abuse of authority, hiding criminals, abandoning duty, and

32

See Bae Jong-dae, Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 95 (8th ed., 2005);
Kim Il-su, Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW:GENERAL PART], 62 (11th ed., 2006); Lee Jae-sang,
Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 19 (5th ed. 2003); Park Sang-Ki, Hyeongbeop
Chongron [CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 31 (6th ed. 2004); Shin Don-Woon, Hyeongbeop Chongron
[CRIMINAL LAW: GENERAL PART], 39-40 (2nd ed. 2006); Yim Woong, Hyeongbeop Chongron [CRIMINAL
LAW: GENERAL PART], 22 (2002).
33
See text accompanying notes 17-20.
34
The Bill submitted as of May 24, 2002 (Bill No. 1582).
35
Id. art. 249(2).
36
Id. art. 253(3).
37
The Bill submitted as of July 11, 2005 (Bill No. 2222).
38
Id. arts. 2 & 4(1).
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perjury during any period that the case is being concealed or fabricated.39
These provisions are to apply to criminal cases where limitation periods do
not expire.40 In civil cases, they are applicable to cases whose limitation
periods have already expired.41 This bill utilizes a constitutionally safer way
in that its extension of the limitation period is not applicable when the
limitation period has already expired. It took into account the possibility
that the Constitutional Court could find the Act unconstitutional. This bill
also did not pass in the National Assembly.
C.

There Is a Contradiction Between the Application of Retroactive
Justice and the Demand for Punishment

There certainly exists the popular demand for punishment of officials
who gravely infringed human rights under the old regime. During the
authoritarian-military rule, citizens had no opportunity to seek justice. The
prosecution of state crimes against human rights was impossible. The ex
post facto principle presupposes a possibility that citizens at least had a
chance to pursue justice through law enforcement authorities. Nevertheless
citizens had to risk their safety to pursue punishment of state crimes against
human rights under the authoritarian-military regime. The principle must
not be taken advantage of by state authority officials or agents who blocked
investigation and prosecution against their own crimes. To prevent
prosecution because of the lapse of statute of limitations would hurt the
popular sense of justice. For that reason, retrospective application of an
amended limitation period to time-barred prosecution should be allowed
under very limited and special circumstances. For instance, after the
Liberation from Japanese Occupation (1910-1945), the Act for Punishing
Anti-Nation Activities 42 was legislated in 1948 to punish pro-Japanese
collaborators. Additionally, after the April 1960 Revolution which ended the
authoritarian Rhee Syung-Man government, the Act for Restricting the Civil
Rights of Anti-Democracy Personals43 was enacted in 1960 to restrict for
five to seven years civil rights of those who had participated in the Rhee
39

Id. art. 3.
Id. Appendix, art. 2(1).
41
Id. Appendix, art. 2(2).
42
Banminjok haengwi cheobeol beop [The Act for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities], Statutes of S.
Korea, Law No. 3 of 1948 (abolished by Law No. 176 of 1951). Different from France, however, the
Special Committee for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities could not produce meaningful outcomes because
of President Rhee Syung-Man’s interference and ultra right-wingers’ attack of the Special Committee.
43
Banminjoo haengwicha kongminkweon chehan beop [The Act for Restricting the Civil Rights of
Anti-Democracy Personals], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 587 of 1960 (abolished by Law No. 1032 of
1962).
40

JUNE 2007

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KOREA

589

government’s illegal activities, including the fabrication of the result of the
March 15 general election of 1960.
Different from extending a limitation period before a given
prosecution is expired, however, much stricter constitutional review is
demanded to apply an amended limitation period retrospectively after the
limitation period has already expired.44 Procedural legality is required even
to punish those who violated human rights under the authoritarian-military
rule. If the new democratic regime weakens procedural legality to serve
substantive justice, it may satisfy the popular demand but undermine the
new regime’s commitment to the rule of law. This is the academic reason
why the two bills to cease or exclude the application of the statute of
limitations did not pass. Ironically, procedural legality, which grew in
Korean society after democratization, prevented the retrospective
punishment of the perpetrators under the old regime after the limitation
period had already expired. The National Assembly was not sure if such an
act could pass constitutional review by the Constitutional Court. As a result,
it was hesitant to fully advance retroactive justice in criminal cases.
However, the National Assembly has been too hesitant in that, regardless of
constitutional review, it could and should have passed a bill to retroactively
extend criminal statutes of limitations so long as the limitation period has
not already run.
IV.

RESTORING THE HONOR OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT
ACTIVISTS

A.

The Next Step Is to Honor the Right of Resistance and Provide
“Justice as Recognition”

The next step to punish the perpetrators is to “restore the honor of
those sacrificed for the democratization movement and their families, and
provide compensation for them.” 45 Under the authoritarian-military regime,
a great number of democratization movement activists were not only
44

For a leading American decision on the issue, see Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420 (1928).
“Certainly it is one thing to revive a prosecution already dead, and another to give it a longer lease of life.
The question turns upon how much violence is done to our instinctive feelings of justice and fair play. For
the state to assure a man that he has become safe from its pursuit, and thereafter to withdraw its assurance,
seems to most of us unfair and dishonest. But, while the chase is on, it does not shock us to have it
extended beyond the time first set, or, if it does, the stake forgives it.” Id. at 425-426.
45
Minjoohwa undong kawnryeonja myeongye hoebok mit bosang e kwanhan beopryul [The Act for
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them],
Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6123 of 2000), art. 1 (last revised by Law No. 8273 of 2007).
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expelled from their schools or companies, but also arrested, detained, and
convicted for the violation of a number of laws such as the Anti-Communist
Act,46 the National Security Act, 47 and the Act Concerning Assembly and
Demonstration.48 Punishment under these laws severely restricted political
rights and freedoms.
In January 2000, under the Kim Dae-Jung government, the Act for
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing
Compensation for Them was enacted (“Democracy Act”). It owed much to
the 422-day non-stop sit-in by human rights organizations such as the
National Association of Bereaved Families for Democracy (cheonguk
minjuhwa undong yukajok hyeopeuihwe) in front of the National Assembly.
The Democracy Act defines “democratization movement” as
“activities that contributed to establishing democratic constitutional order
and resurrecting and enhancing freedoms and rights of people by resisting
the authoritarian rule that had disturbed free democratic basic order and
violated people’s fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution since
August 7, 1969.”49
The Democracy Act shows that the “right of resistance” against an
illegitimate regime,50 which is not available in the Constitution, is officially
recognized in the Democracy Act. It implies that a number of “illegal”
activities against “the” authoritarian rule may be justified as an exercise of
“right of resistance.” The act maintains the beginning date of the
authoritarian rule as August 7, 1969, when the bill for revision of the
Constitution was passed only by the ruling government party in order to let

46
Bangong beop [Anti-Communist Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 643 of 1961 (abolished by
Law No. 3318 of 1980).
47
Kukgaboan beop [National Security Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 3318 of 1980 (last revised
by Law No. 5454 of 1997). For more discussion regarding this Act see Kuk Cho, Tension between the
National Security Law and Constitutionalism in South Korea: Security for What?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125
(1997).
48
Chiphoe mit siwi e kwanhan beopryul [Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration], Statutes of
S. Korea, Law No. 1245 of 1962 (last abolished by Law No. 7849 of 2001).
49
The Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing
Compensation for Them, Act No. 6123, art. 2.1 (emphasis added).
50
The right to resist against illegitimate regime was incorporated into the documents of the
American and French Revolutions. See THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 107, 118 (Walter Laqueur & Barry
Rubin ed., 1979). The right was explicitly recognized in a number of early American state constitutions.
For instance, Article Ten of the New Hampshire Constitution of 1797 states that “whenever the ends of
government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are
ineffectual, the doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.” [N.H. CONST. art. 10 (1797), reprinted in THE TREE OF
LIBERTY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF REBELLION AND POLITICAL CRIME IN AMERICA 85 (Nicholas N.
Kittrie & Eldon D., Jr. Wedlock eds., 1986).

JUNE 2007

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN KOREA

591

President Park Chung-Hee be elected once more.51 Although the revision
was approved by popular referendum later, it was the first step to make
President Park a permanent president.52
The Act also classifies “democratization movement involvers” into the
following categories: (i) those who were dead or lost in connection with the
democratization movement, (ii) those who were injured in connection with
the democratization movement, (iii) those who fell ill or became dead due to
illness in connection with the democratization movement, and (iv) those
who were convicted, fired or disciplined in connection with the
democratization movement.53 The “democratization movement involvers”
in the May 18 Uprising of 1980 are covered by the 1990 Act for Restoring
the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing
Compensation for Them.54
The Review Committee for Restoring the Honor of Democratization
Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them (“The Review
Committee”) 55 was organized under the prime minister with the task of
examining whether or not applicants were “democratization movement
involvers”, and deciding what kind of disposition was to be made for them.56
Former Constitutional Court Justice Ha Kyong-Chul was appointed as
chairman of the Review Committee. Although the Review Committee itself
is neither an investigative nor a judicial authority, it has authority to make a
necessary inquiry into the case and make a request to the relevant
authorities.57 It may recommend a pardon for those who were convicted in
connection with the democratization movement, or abolishment of the
record of their conviction.58 It may also make recommendations to state and
local governments, or private companies to rehire those who were fired in
51

See Daehan minguk heonbeop [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA OF 1969], art.
69(3)(amended 1969; last amended 1987).
52
The Act does not provide an explanation why the beginning of the authoritarian rule was fixed on
August 7, 1969 even though Presidents Rhee Syung-Man and Park Chung-Hee exercised authoritarian rule
before the date. It is assumed that the set up of the authoritarian rule in constitutional level on August 7,
1969 was considered.
53
Minjoohwa undong kawnryeonja myeongye hoebok mit bosang e kwanhan beopryul [The Act for
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them],
Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6123 of 2000, art. 2.2 (last revised by Law No 8273 of 2007).
54
See Kwangju minjuhwa undong kwanryeonja bosang deung e kwanhan beopryul [Act for
Compensation for the Victims in the Democratization Movement in Kwangju], Statutes of S. Korea Act,
Law No. 4266 of 1990) (last revised by Law No. 7911 of 2006).
55
Minjoo.go.kr, http://www.minjoo.go.kr.
56
The Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing
Compensation for Them, Act No.6123, art. 4(2).
57
Id. art. 2(1).
58
Id. art. 5-3.
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connection with the democratization movement. 59 It may also make
recommendations to schools to abolish records of discipline on those who
were disciplined in connection with the democratization movement and to
bestow honorary graduation diplomas to them.60
Under the old regime, a number of democratization movement
activists were given a label of “pro-communism” or “impure left leaning”
radical subversives.61 Following the examination of the applications by the
Review Committee, a number of democratization movement activists have
been recognized as “democratization movement involvers.” Disposition for
honor restoration and compensation has been made for them. As of
December 28, 2006, 543 “democratization movement involvers” have been
given a total of $28,700,000 in compensation. 62 The decisions of the
Review Committee can be considered to give “justice as recognition” and
“compensatory justice” to those who sacrificed themselves to fight for
democracy.63
One of the most high-profile cases is of the “People’s Revolution
Party Rebuilding Committee” (inmin hyeokmyeong dang jaekeon
wiwonhwei), (“PRP”). This has been broadly known as a typical case of
fabrication by torture. As the anti-Yushin movement by college students and
intellectuals was getting stronger in 1974, the KCIA arrested alleged PRP
members because they had allegedly pursued a communist revolution with
connections to North Korea. Eight members were immediately executed just
one day after their conviction was confirmed by the Supreme Court in 1975.
For this reason, this case has been often called “judicial murder.”64
In January 2006, the Review Committee decided that the conviction
of sixteen PRP members was based on facts fabricated as a result of the
KCIA’s severe torture, and the genuine reason why they were suppressed
was because they had actively developed an anti-Yushin regime
movement. 65 In December 2005, before the decision by the Review
Committee, the Committee for Development through Finding Truth of the

59

Id. art. 5-4.
Id. art. 5-5.
James M. West & Edward J. Baker, The 1987 Constitutional Reforms in South Korea: Electoral
Process and Judicial Independence, in HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 139 (William Shaw ed., 1991).
62
Dong Jung-Min, [Recognizing 46 Illegal Labor Activists as Democtratic Activites], DONG-A ILBO,
Dec. 18, 2006 (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
63
Barahona, supra note 1, at 25.
64
Catholic Human Rights Committee, SABEOP SALIN: 1975 NYEON SAWOL EUI HAKSAL [JUDICIAL
MURDER: THE MASSACRE OF APRIL 1975], 164-65 (2001).
65
The decision is available at http://www.minjoo.go.kr/section/news/reportcontentDB.html?inum=
113&iKind=3&szSearchWord=&szSearchItem=&IGotoPage=1 (last visited Apr. 26, 2007).
60
61
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Past66 under the National Intelligence Service (the successor to the KCIA)
also found that the PRP case was fabricated by torture.67 On December 27,
2005, the Seoul Central District Court decided to reexamine the conviction
of the members,68 and in January 23, 2007, the court overruled the previous
conviction.69
B.

The Extent of the Democratization Movement Remains Controversial

1.

The Case of the Dong-Eui University Students—Embracing CounterViolence by the Democratization Movement

In May 1989, students of Dong-Eui University staged a sit-in at the
library building on campus to demonstrate against corrupt entrance exam
procedures. They also detained five police officers. When the police
entered the library to break up the sit-in, some students threw Molotov
cocktails at the police. A fire broke out, killing seven police officers. The
students were arrested and convicted of murder by arson. 70 This violent
confrontation between college students and the authoritarian regime’s police
resulted in a terrible tragedy, which poses difficult questions of whether
violent and lethal anti-regime activities can be considered a part of the
democratization movement.
It was inevitable that the Review Committee’s decision to
acknowledge forty-six students of Dong-Eui University as “democratization
movement involvers,” on April 27, 2002 would provoke controversy. The
Review Committee focused on the fact that the students’ conduct was a
routine method of demonstration without intent to kill police officers at that
time, even though it resulted in the death of several police officers; the grave
66

Baek Ki-Chul, [NIS Committee for Development through Finding Truth of the Past Starts],
HANKYOREH (S. Korea), Nov. 2, 2004; Park Joo-Ho, [NIS Begins Truth Finding of the Past] KOOKMIN ILBO
(S. Korea), Nov. 2, 2004; Chang Yong-Hoon, [NIS Starts out to Find Truth of the Past], YONHAP NEWS (S.
Korea), Nov. 2, 2004.
67
Lee Hee-Jin,[The PRP Case Fabricated as Directed by Park Chung-Hee], HANKOOK ILBO (S.
Korea), Dec. 12, 2005; Son Byung-Ho,[The Truth Finding Committee Said the PRP Case was Fabricated
on the Request of the Former President Park] KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), Dec. 7, 2005; Chung JoonYoung.,[Behind the PRP Case, There was a Man in Power], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), Dec. 7, 2005.
68
Chun Ji-Sung & Chung Hyo-Shin, [The People’s Revolution Party Case Will Be on Retrial After
30 Years], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Dec. 28, 2005; Choe Young-Yoon, [The People’s Revolution Party
Case Is Decided to Be on Retrial], HANKOOK ILBO (S. Korea), Dec. 27, 2005; Ko Na-Moo, [The Truth of
Judicial Murder Will Be Revealed After 30 Years], HANKYOREH (S. Korea), Dec. 27, 2005.
69
Lee Jong-Suk, [Sentence of Innocence to the Defendants of the People’s Revolution Party Case
After 32 Years], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Jan. 24, 2007; Choe Young-Yoon, [Sentence of Innocence to the
People’s Revolution Party Case After 32 Years], HANKOOK ILBO (S. Korea), Jan. 24, 2007; Park Sung-Woo,
[No Evidence to Prove Anti-State Organization], JOONG ANG ILBO (S. Korea), Jan. 24, 2007.
70
Decision of June 22, 1990, 90 Do 767 & 90 Do 764 (Korean Supreme Court).
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result of the students’ conduct did not prevent their conduct from being
regarded as part of a democratization movement.
The family members of the dead police officers filed a constitutional
petition to the Constitutional Court, arguing that the decision of the Review
Committee and the Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization
Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them violated their
constitutional rights. On October 27, 2005, a 5-to-4 majority opinion of the
Constitutional Court rejected the petition because (i) the family members did
not have standing for the petition; (ii) the decision did not necessarily cast
the dead police officers in a negative light because the officers already
received the title of “officers of merit”; and (iii) the Act is constitutional
because it does not disadvantage those who stood on the opposite side of the
democratization movement.71 However, the minority opinion argued that the
decision of the Review Committee was unconstitutional because, despite the
students’ desire to resist the authoritarian regime, the students resorted to
means which were destructive, which cannot be tolerated in a democratic
order. The minority opinion reasoned that if the students’ conduct was
acknowledged as a democratization movement, the dead policemen would
inevitably be considered agents of the authoritarian regime.72
In addition to other police officers, conservative party members and
newspapers strongly objected to the Review Committee and the
Constitutional Court’s two decisions, claiming that these decisions turned
cop-killers into democratization movement activists.73 Criticism was raised
from a different standpoint as well. Moon Boo-Sik, who as a student
movement leader in 1982 burnt the American Culture Center in Pusan,
causing an innocent student’s death to protest the U.S. government’s
leniency toward Korea’s authoritarian regime, called for serious reflection
on the use of counter-violence by a democratization movement.74
The Review Committee and the majority opinion of the Constitutional
Court seemed to consider the socio-political background of the tragedy, in
which tear gas bombs from the police and Molotov cocktails from
demonstrating students were exchanged. They also seemed to consider the
contribution of student movements toward democratization. Article 2 of the
71

Decision of October 27, 2005, 2002 HunMa 425 (Korean Constitutional Court).
Id. (Kwon, J., Kim, J., Song, J., Joo, J., dissenting).
73
Editorial, [Rethinking Democratic Movement], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), Oct. 28, 2005; Editorial,
[The Dong-Eui University Case: The Violence Unallowable Under the Liberal Democracy], MUNHAW ILBO
(S. Korea), Apr. 28, 2006; Editorial, [Did The Consitutional Court Reflect the Historical Consciousness on
its Dismissal of the Dong-Eui University Case?], SEGYE ILBO (S. Korea), Oct. 28, 2005.
74
Moon Boo-Sik, IN SEARCH OF THE LOST MEMORY—THINKING OF THE AGE OF MADNESS
(ileobeorin kieok eul chataseo—kwangkieui sidae reul saenggak ham), chap. 5 (2002).
72
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Act seems to consider the deaths of state authority officers as an acceptable
collateral consequence of recognizing the “right of resistance” in the 2000
Democracy Act. 75 The fact that the Dong-Eui University students were
given the title of “democratization movement involvers” while the sacrificed
police officers were given the title of “officers of merit” shows the
complicated situation of the past. Despite the fact that the Dong-Eui
University students were legally classified as “democratization movement
involvers,” there still remains a more fundamental question about the
legitimacy of counter-violence against the old regime. To cite Moon BooSik:
It is not honest to say that several kinds of counter-violence was
all inevitable, or had a nature of self-defense. Criticism on the
context of democratization movement that did not limit the use
of violence as an inevitable means of resistance, defense and
last resort for expression, . . . rather advocated violence as a
tool to create a new power has been reserved because it may
work as a ground to justify the violence of state authority.76
2.

The Case of the “National Liberation Front of South Korea”
Embraced the Leftist Democratization Movement

It is also noteworthy that in March 2006 the Review Committee
acknowledged twenty-nine members of the “National Liberation Front of
South Korea” (Namchoseon minjokhaebang cheonseon, hereinafter “NLF”)
as “democratization movement involvers.”77
During the late 1970s, the NLF vigorously fought against the
authoritarian-military regime with an anti-America, anti-Yushin, and anticapitalism agenda, and its members were punished heavily for violating the
Anti-Communist Act and the National Security Act. Its leader was
sentenced to capital punishment, but died after being tortured before his
scheduled execution; another leader also was executed.
While the Review Committee fully recognized the radical, left-wing
characteristics of the NLF, it acknowledged that the NLF’s activities in
75
Minjoohwa undong kawnryeonja myeongye hoebok mit bosang e kwanhan beopryul [The Act for
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them],
Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6123 of 2000, art. 2.1 (last revised by Law No 8273 of 2007).
76
Moon, supra note 74, at 165 (translated by this author).
77
See REVIEW COMMITTEE FOR RESTORING THE HONOR OF DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT
INVOLVERS AND PROVIDING COMPENSATION FOR THEM, REPORT: NAMINJUHN GWANRYON BODO E DEHAN
HAEMYUNG (2006), available at http://www.minjoo.go.kr/section/news/reportcontentDB.html?inum=
115&iKind=3&szSearchWord=&szSearchItem=&IGotoPage=1.
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general could be considered as political resistance against the authoritarian
Yushin regime. Conservative right-wing newspapers and civic organizations
strongly criticized the decision of the Review Committee because the
ultimate goal of the NLF was a leftist revolution.78
The decision shows that the Review Committee understands and
embraces the leftist democratization movement in a broad sense. The AntiCommunist Act and the National Security Act reflected the anti-communist
ideology of the authoritarian-military regime, and considered all leftist
activities “non-democratic” and severely punished them. The Review
Committee in this decision aimed to evaluate impartially the contribution of
the leftist democratization movement. Its decision fell in line with the
decision of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs in February 2002
and in August 2005 to confer decorations on a number of leftist activists
who fought for national liberation under the Japanese Occupation.79 Similar
to the liberation movement against the Japanese Occupation, the leftist
democratization movement was acknowledged as an integral part of the
broader democratization movement against the authoritarian-military
regime.
The Review Committee’s decision reveals that Korea has freed itself
of the “red complex” which at one time overshadowed it. It also reflects the
broader political spectrum of contemporary Korean democracy. A leftist
party such as the “Democratic Labor Party” (minju nodong dang), which
could have been harshly punished had it been organized under the
authoritarian-military regime, is currently legalized and has seats in the
National Assembly.

78
Editorial, [A “Champion of Democracy” Who Stole Military Weapons Attempting to Communize
South Korea], DONG-A ILBO (S. KOREA), Mar. 16, 2006; Editorial, [Ungrounded Decisions Regarding
Democratization Movements], SEGYE ILBO (S. KOREA), Mar. 16, 2006.
79
Kim Jung-Kwon, [54 Socialists Recognized by Decoration], HANKOOK ILBO (S. KOREA), Feb. 22,
2005; Jun Sung-Chul, [Independence Movement 214 Persons Aug. 15 Decoration], HANKOOK ILBO (S.
KOREA), Aug. 3, 2005; Sung Gul Kim, [Decorations Granted to 214 Independence Fighters Including
Socialists], HANKYOREH (S. KOREA), Aug. 3, 2005; Media News Team, [54 Socialists Recognized as
Fighters for Independence], KYONH-HYANG SHINUM (S. KOREA), Feb. 22, 2002; Choi Hyun-Soo, [The
Decorations Awarded to Leftists: No More Ideological Basis.], KOOKMIN ILBO (S. KOREA), Feb. 22, 2002;
Yang Sung-Wook, [Independence Day Decoration for Fighters for Independence], MUNHWA ILBO (S.
KOREA), Feb. 22, 2002.
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Under the authoritarian-military regime a number of democratization
activists and critical intellectuals were found dead. State authorities
announced that they had died either by accident or suicide. The torture
victims’ outcries were not heard under that regime and the State ignored the
families’ requests to re-examine the cause of these suspicious deaths.
Suggestions that law enforcement officers tortured citizens during
interrogation, or that they concealed such deaths resulting from torture, often
were treated as fallacious attacks on the regime’s legitimacy. It was only
after democratization that victims and their families were given credence.
The Special Act for Truth-Finding about Suspicious Deaths was
passed in 2001 under the Kim Dae-Jung government. Like the 2000 Act for
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing
Compensation for Them, the Special Act owed much to the non-stop sit-in in
front of the National Assembly by the Korea Association of Bereaved
Families for Democracy.80 The Korean public wanted to disrupt the silence
of the past to learn the truth. The Presidential Truth Commission on
Suspicious Deaths (“The Truth Commission”) was established for this task,81
and it investigated the circumstances surrounding the suspicious deaths
related the democratization movement before June 2004. Professors Yang
Seung-Kyu and Han Sang-Beom served consecutive terms as chairman of
the Commission.
The Special Act defined “suspicious death” as “deaths that occurred
with relation to the democratization movement whose cause has not been
identified and which shows probable cause that it might have resulted from
direct or indirect illegal exercise of state authority.” 82 The definition of
“democratization movement” followed the definition provided by the 2000
Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and
Providing Compensation for Them.83

80
Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001, art. 1 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of
2005).
81
Id. art. 3.
82
Id. art. 2.
83
Id.; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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The Truth Commission was given the authority to initiate an
investigation of a suspicious death upon the filing of a petition, or by its own
decision in the absence of a petition.84 Its powers were as follows: it could
request relevant individuals to appear for investigation and relevant
authorities to submit data and materials pertinent to the investigation;85 it
also could perform a field investigation in the place where the suspicious
death allegedly occurred;86 if it found evidence of a crime, it could file a
complaint to the Attorney General or the Chief of the Military General
Staff,87 and request law enforcement authorities to investigate the case;88 it
could issue an “order of accompanying” to a person who refused to appear
without just cause;89 if its investigation concluded that the suspicious death
resulted from an illegal exercise of state authority in the process of
democratization, the Truth Commission was obliged to request the Review
Committee for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement
Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them to review the case.90
However, the Truth Commission was neither an investigative nor a
judicial authority, and therefore it was given neither the authority to search
and seize relevant materials and institute prosecution, nor the authority to
subpoena witnesses and suspects. Law enforcement authorities did not want
to provide the Truth Commission with such authority. Only administrative
fines could be imposed on those who did not cooperate with the Truth
Commission’s investigation without just cause or refused to follow the
request for appearance without just cause.91 In this sense, the activities of
the Truth Commission were so limited that it had difficulty discovering the
truth surrounding suspicious deaths without the voluntary cooperation of
relevant persons and state authorities.

84

The Special Act for Truth-Finding of Suspicious Deaths, Law No. 6170, art. 21.
Id. art. 22(1).
86
Id. art. 22(3).
87
Id. art. 25(1).
88
Id. art. 25(2).
89
Id. art. 22 (8).
90
Id. art. 26.
91
Id. art. 37. Imprisonment may be imposed on those who committed assault or battery to the
officials of the Truth Commission. Id. art. 34.
85
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Three Major Decisions by the Truth Commission Found Suspicious
Deaths Related to the Democratization Movement

The Truth Commission recognized thirty cases in total as cases of
“suspicious death,” 92 while it classified others as “impossible to
investigate” 93 due to a lack of evidence and dismissed those that lacked
merit. Major decisions are reviewed below.
1.

The Case of Victims Killed Under “Protective Custody”

In 2001 the Truth Commission acknowledged that the deaths of two
inmates, which occurred while they were incarcerated under the pretext of
“protective custody” (bohokamho),94 were “suspicious deaths.”
In 1980 the military coup committee issued Martial Order No. 13,
which was to put vagrants and repeat criminals into concentration camps
under the name of “Samcheong Education.” 95 Later the “Legislative
Council for Protection of the State” wrote the Social Protection Act 96 to
provide legal grounds for applying the Martial Order retroactively. The
Social Protection Act imposed “protective custody” on repeat felons when
they were found to have “danger of recommitting crimes.” 97 However,
under the Act even ordinary citizens who were neither vagrant nor criminal
were incarcerated in the camps. Inmates were extremely abused under the
harsh and oppressive “education.” Later, those who were put under
“protective custody” were incarcerated in strict confinement centers in the
Cheongsong region.

92
Kim Nam-Kwon, [The Second Suspcious Death Activites Outlook] , YONHAP NEWS (S. KOREA),
Apr. 30, 2003; Choi Sung-Hyun, [The Second Suspicious Death Activites Report to Cheongwadae],
YONHAP NEWS (S. KOREA), July 30, 2004.
93
The Special Act for Truth-Finding of Suspicious Deaths, Law No. 6170, art. 24-2. The decision of
“impossibility of investigation” is made when the Truth Commission finds that it was not clear if the death
happened in the process of democratization movement, or resulted from illegal exercise of state authority.
94
“Protective custody” is one of “protective security measures” (boancheobun or Maβnahmen in
German). In Korean criminal law, there are two types of criminal sanctions: punishment and “protective
security measures.” The Korean Constitution provides legal basis for this distinction, saying that no
punishment or protective security disposition shall be imposed without law [The Constitution, §12 (1)].
These two sanctions are distinguished in theory in that the first is imposed on those with the capability to be
responsible for their past criminal conduct, while the second is used to rehabilitate criminals and protect
society from any future crimes that non-rehabilitated criminals may commit. The second is prescribed
mainly in special criminal acts.
95
See generally Suh Young-Soo, SAMCHEONG KYOYOOKDAE: POGORYONG 13 HO [SAMCHEONG
EDUCATION UNIT: THE MARTIAL ORDER NO. 13] (2004).
96
Sahoeboho Beop [Social Protection Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 3286 of 1980, (abolished
by Law No. 7656 of 2005).
97
Id. art. 5.
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The Truth Commission found that in 1981, Jean Jeong-Bae had been
shot dead in a concentration camp by military officers while protesting
against the “Samcheong Education.” It was determined that he was involved
in the democratization movement because he contested his illegal
detainment by requesting a formal trial and met with a higher-ranking
official.98 In 1984, jailors cruelly treated Park Young-Doo, and he died in a
discipline cell at a heavy confinement facility in the Cheongsong region after
he demanded the abolition of “protective custody,” an end to jailors’
violence against inmates, and improvement of treatment for inmates. His
body was buried without an autopsy or his family’s attendance.99
2.

The Case of Professor Tsche Chong-Kil, Killed During Interrogation
by the KCIA

In May 2002, the Truth Commission acknowledged that the death of
Professor Tsche Chong-Kil of Seoul National University College of Law
was a “suspicious death.”100
In 1973, Professor Tsche was found dead in a KCIA building and the
KCIA announced that he had committed suicide by throwing himself out of
a building after confessing he was a spy for North Korea. The KCIA
interrogated him because a self-surrendered North Korean spy had
mentioned his name. However, the Truth Commission found that KCIA
agents tortured him during interrogation and that he had never confessed to
being a spy. They further determined there was a high probability that he
was killed and his body was thrown away by the agents; and even if he did
throw himself, it was probably to evade additional torture by the agents.
They also found the case of a spy group in Europe that the KCIA announced
after his death was fabricated.
98
Kim Hoon, [Suspicious Death: Truth-Finding Commission Recognizing the Death at Samcheoung
Education Camp as a Democrazation Movement.], THE HANKYOREH (S. Korea), Sept. 16, 2001; Oh NamSuk, [Jean Jeong-Bae Shot Dead in a Concentration Camp is Recognized to be Involved in a
“Democratization Movement.”], MUNHWA ILBO (S. Korea), Sept. 17, 2001.
99
Yang Ki-Dae, [First Recognition of Mysterious Death at Samcheong Education: Mr. Park YoungDoo’s Death Due to Prison Official Violence], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), June 25, 2001; Jung Young-Oh,
[Recognition of Park [Young Doo’s Death as Associated with Democratic Movement], HANKUK ILBO (S.
Korea), June 25, 2001; Kang Young-Soo, [Mysterious Death of Park Young-Doo: Caused by Prison Official
Abuse], KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), June 25, 2001; Kim Sung-Jin, [Mysterious Death: First Recognition of
Democratic Association], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), June 25, 2001.
100
Min Dong-Yong, [Fabricated Espionage Allegation by the Government Proved: Professor Tsche
Recognized as a Victim of Suspicious Death.], DONG-A ILBO (S. Korea), May 27, 2002; Kim Jae-Joong,
[Truth-Finding Commission Concluded Professor Tsche was Killed by the Government Exercising Public
Powers], KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), May 27, 2002; Kim Nam-Kwon, [Recognition of Professor Tsche
Chong-Kil’s Death as Related to Democratization Movement], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), May 27, 2002.
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In February 2006, the Seoul High Court decided that the State should
provide about 1.8 billion won (equivalent to approximately 1.9 million U.S.
dollars) to Professor Tsche’s family as compensation. The court reasoned
that the state cannot rely on the statute of limitations if state authorities have
fabricated and concealed the truth. 101 As in Susie Kim’s case, 102 this
decision reflects that Korean jurisprudence distinguishes retroactive civil
sanction from retroactive criminal sanction.
3.

A Controversial Case: North Korean Spies Killed in Prison

In July 2004, the Truth Commission made a controversial decision. It
acknowledged that the death in prison of two former North Korean spies and
one former communist partisan during the Korean War were “suspicious
deaths.”103 It found that state authorities tortured and forced them to convert
their political beliefs before they were killed in prison under the Yushin
regime.
The Social Security Act 104 enacted in 1975 enabled the
imprisonment of a number of non-converted leftists, including North Korean
spies, after they had served their sentences on the grounds that there was a
“danger of recommitting crimes.”105 “Security custody,” which is another
kind of “protective security measures,”106 was imposed by the Ministry of
Justice, 107 not the judiciary, and could be renewed repeatedly until “anticommunism was established” in the leftists’ minds.108 Under this system,
leftists who refused to submit a “conversion document” to state authorities
faced the danger that they might never be released.
The Truth Commission confirmed that the three inmates were killed
by “illegal exercise of state authority,” although it was disputed whether
their death met the requirement of the “death happening with relation to the
democratization movement” in the Special Act.109 The Truth Commission
101
[Seoul High Court decided, “the State should provide about 1.8 billion won to Professor Tsche’s
family as compensation”], THE LAW TIMES (S. Korea), Feb. 25, 2006.
102
See text accompanying notes 30-32.
103
Kim Sung-Hoon, [A New Controversy: Truth Commision Recognized Leftsts’ Contribution to
Demoritization], MUNHAW ILBO (S. Korea), July 1, 2004; Jung Sung-Ho, [Controversy over the Truth
Commission Recognizing Non-Converted Leftists to be Involved in Demoratization], YONHAP NEWS (S.
Korea), July 2, 2004.
104
Sahoeancheon Beop [Social Security Act], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 2769 of 1975 (last
revised by Law No. 3993 of 1987).
105
Id. § 6 (1).
106
See supra note 94.
107
Social Security Act, supra note 104, § 7 (4).
108
Id. § 7 (1).
109
Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001, art. 2 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of
2005) (emphasis added).
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interpreted the requirement broadly, maintaining that it was unconstitutional
and illegal to force them to convert their political beliefs, and that their
resistance contributed to the abolishment of the undemocratic “conversion
system.” Conservative politicians, newspapers, and civic organizations
strongly criticized the decision, arguing that the inmates adhered to their
communist beliefs and their resistance could not be classified as a part of the
democratization movement.110
Soon after the Truth Commission rendered its decision, the Review
Committee for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement
Involvers and Providing Compensation for Them111 rejected the decision of
the Truth Commission.112 The Review Committee has the final authority to
confirm whether a suspicious death is related to the democratization
movement. 113 The Review Committee distinguished North Korean spies
from home-grown leftists, as it acknowledged in 2006 that the activities of
the home-grown leftist NLF belonged to the democratization movement.114
Separate civil suits may be pursued to compensate for the deaths of the two
former North Korean spies and the one former communist partisan.
C.

Conclusion: The Truth Commission Made Great Achievements
Despite Limitations

The Truth Commission was dissolved in 2004. It left a number of
unsolved cases. For instance, mysteries still surround the deaths of Chang
Joon-Ha, a leading dissident against the Park Chung-Hee regime, found dead
on a mountain in 1974, and two student activists, Lee Chul-Kyu and Lee
Rae-Chang, who were found dead in a reservoir and on a beach respectively
in 1999. Crucial witnesses and evidence were not available after the long
lapse of time since their deaths. It is necessary to note, from the beginning
110
Editorial, [Even Spys are Democratization Fighters to the Eyes of the Truth Comission], DONG-A
ILBO (S. Korea), July 2, 2004; Editorial, [A Country Recognizing Even North Korean Spys as
Democratization Fighters], MUNHWA ILBO (S. Korea), July 2, 2004; Editorial, [They Said North Korean
Spys Contributed to Democratization], PUSAN ILBO (S. Korea), July 2, 2004; Editorial, [A Refusal to Turn
From a Spy is a Demoratization Movement?], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July 2, 2004.
111
See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
112
Choi Young-Yun, [Millitary Tribunal Should be Disbanded Except During War Time], HANKOOK
ILBO (S. Korea), July 30, 2004; Kang Ju-Hwa, [Truth Commission’s Report Calls for Invalidating the
Convictions Against Democratization Activists and Establishing an Authority to Find the Cause Of Deaths],
KOOKMIN ILBO (S. Korea), July 30, 2004; Cho Sung-Hyun [The Truth Commission Presses the
Governmement to Establish an Authority to Identify the Cause of Death.], YONHAP NEWS (S. Korea), July
30, 2004.
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Euimunsa chinsang kyumyeong e kwanhan teukbyeolbeop [The Special Act for Truth-Finding of
Suspicious Deaths], Statutes of S. Korea, Law No. 6170 of 2001, art. 26 (last revised by Act No. 7796 of
2005).
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the Truth Commission had limited legal authority to discover the actual truth
about suspicious deaths; 115 and other state authorities were reluctant to
cooperate with the investigation of the Truth Commission for fear that their
own misconduct would be uncovered. 116
When concluding their
investigation, the Truth Commission recommended that the government and
the National Assembly enact a new law to bar application of the statute of
limitations to state crimes against human rights, to punish perjury or refusal
to submit relevant materials in hearings for rectifying past wrongs, and to
require disclosure of all information regarding past wrongs.117
Despite these difficulties, however, the Truth Commission made
substantial contributions to advancement of Korean society. Their findings
consoled the victims’ hurt souls and healed the trauma of the victims’
families. They also made Korean people look back on the dark shadow of
the painful past and made them determined to maintain democracy in
Korean society.
VI.

BROADENING THE SCOPE OF ILLUSTRATING PAST WRONGS

A.

Uncovering the Activities of Pro-Japanese Collaborators Under the
Japanese Occupation and Reverting Their Property to the State

The fact that the pro-Japanese Koreans who sided with Japanese rule
and oppressed the Korean liberation movement under the Japanese
Occupation (1910-1945) were not thoroughly investigated and justly
sanctioned even after the Liberation of 1945 has posed a lingering political
and social problem for Koreans.
President Rhee Syung-Man and his far right-wing conservative allies,
who gained political hegemony over the left after the Liberation, objected to
the thorough abolition of colonial legacies. With a strong anti-communist
and anti-North Korean agenda, pro-Japanese Koreans supported the party’s
fight against the leftist movement in South Korea. Although in 1948 the Act
for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities 118 was enacted and the Special
Committee for Punishing Anti-Nation Activities was formed in the National
115
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Assembly, President Rhee and his political allies substantially interfered
with the activities of the Special Committee. The Special Committee was
ultimately dissolved without any meaningful achievement. 119 Since then,
pro-Japanese Koreans have survived and even flourished in Korea.
Successive authoritarian-military governments have not attempted to
investigate them. The fact that a number of political and social leaders
including Park Chung-Hee had served as a bureaucrat or military officer
under the Japanese Occupation was one of the factors that prevented
thorough investigation of the pro-Japanese Koreans’ activities under the
Japanese Occupation.120
Although the legacy of the Japanese Occupation in Korean society has
received much academic attention, it was not until the Roh Moo-Hyun
government that legal action was taken to address these issues. There has
been strong pressure from civil society to investigate the pro-Japanese
Koreans’ activities under the Japanese Occupation. For instance, in August
1999, 10,000 professors signed a declaration demanding that an
Encyclopedia of Anti-Nation Pro-Japanese Collaborators be published. 121
Then, in 2001 the Institute for Research of the Nation Issues, 122 an
independent research organization, formed a board of editors to take
responsibility for publishing it. The public further demonstrated its interest
in and support for this project by successfully completing a fundraising
campaign and raising the funds required for the project in 2004 after the
government had cut off public funding for the project in 2003.123
Although the Korean Constitution provides “No citizen shall suffer
unfavorable treatment on account of an act not of his own doing but
committed by a relative,” 124 a label of descendants of pro-Japanese
collaborators is likely to entail significant social and political damage to
politicians. Conservatives at first were concerned that legal action could
lead to political biases that would harm conservative political leaders,
119
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including Park Geun-Hye, a daughter of Park Chung-Hee, but public support
for the Special Act overwhelmed their opposition.125 The newly-revealed
fact that the parents or great-grandparents of some leading liberal politicians,
including Shin Ki-Nam, 126 shockingly were found to have served under the
Japanese rule also neutralized the conservatives’ concern. As a result,
objections to legal action became politically incorrect and politically risky.
In 2004, the Special Act for Finding the Truth of Anti-Nation Activities
under the Japanese Occupation was enacted.127
In 2005, the Presidential Committee for Act for Finding the Truth of
Pro-Japanese Anti-Nation Activities (“Presidential Committee”) was
organized and Professor Kang Man-Kil, a leading historian, was appointed
as chairman. 128 The Presidential Committee is to investigate “pro-Japanese
anti-Nation activities”; to collect, analyze, and edit data about “pro-Japanese
anti-Nation activities”; and to establish a historical museum about “proJapanese anti-Nation activities.”129
The Special Act classifies “pro-Japanese anti-Nation activities” into
twenty categories. These include: attacking or obstructing the liberation
movement; killing, abusing, or arresting liberation movement activists or
their family members; leading an organization with the purpose of
obstructing the liberation movement; spying for the Japanese regime;
making or conspiring to make a treaty with the Japanese government to
infringe the Korean Nation’s sovereignty; receiving a peerage from Japanese
government for their activities for Korea’s annexation to Japan; forcing
females to provide sexual services for the Japanese army; cooperating and
participating as a military officer in the Japanese invasion; performing
activities as a high-ranking government official to suppress Koreans; and
cooperating with the Japanese destruction of Korean culture and carrying
Korean cultural heritages out of Korea.130
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The Presidential Committee was given a four-year mandate to initiate
investigations of anti-Nation activities at its own volition.131 The Committee
may request relevant individuals to appear for inquiry, and require relevant
individuals and authorities to submit pertinent data and materials.132 It may
issue an order of accompaniment to a person who has crucial evidentiary
proof or information but refuses to appear more than three times without just
cause.133 Like the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths,134
the Presidential Committee is neither an investigative nor a judicial
authority. Most often administrative fines could be imposed only on those
who obstructed the inquiry of the Presidential Committee, 135 although
imprisonment may be imposed on those who made a false statement or
submitted false materials with the purpose of obstructing the investigation.136
The Presidential Committee currently is engaged in preliminary matters.
In the same context that the 2004 Special Act for Finding the Truth of
Anti-Nation Activities under the Japanese Occupation was passed, the 2005
Special Act for Reverting the Property of Anti-Nation Pro-Japanese
Collaborators to State was enacted in 2005.137
The 2005 Special Act was passed in response to public outcry over
court rulings, which enabled descendants of pro-Japanese Koreans to
retrieve lands and properties from the State. These descendants, who filed
lawsuits, won in some instances even though the lands were given by the
Japanese government in exchange for their ascendants’ pro-Japanese
activities. 138 For example, the great-grandson of Lee Wan-Yong, who as
Prime Minister of the short-lived Empire of Korea (1897-1910) facilitated
Korea’s annexation to Japan and received a peerage from the Japanese
government for his pro-Japanese efforts, won back his great-grandfather’s
lands in a civil trial in the Seoul High Court in 1997.139 The public furvor
131
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over this result led the National Assembly to pass the 2005 Special Act. The
Act aims to prevent the successors or descendants of the pro-Japanese
Koreans who received properties from the Japanese government given in
exchange for “pro-Japanese anti-Nation activities” from retrieving such
properties.140
B.

Making a Politically Neutral Extension of Past Lustration: The 2005
Basic Act for Coping with Past History for Truth and Reconciliation

The two laws—the “2000 Act for Restoring the Honor of
Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing Compensation for
Them” and the “2001 Special Act for Truth-Finding of Suspicious Deaths”
—have received criticism from two different angles. From one side, liberals
complain that the laws do not cover past wrongs committed by the state
before August 7, 1969, 141 and that the Truth Commission on Suspicious
Deaths was dissolved without resolving a number of high profile cases.142
On the other side, conservatives argue that the laws do not cover the terrors
and human rights violations committed by those who were antagonistic to
the Republic of Korea. In 2004, each political party submitted its own bills
to rectify past wrongs.143
In 2005 the Basic Act for Coping with Past History for Truth and
Reconciliation was enacted in 2005 as a compromise. 144 The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission was established as an independent organization,
and Catholic Father Song Kee-In, who has been a long-time advisor to
President Roh Moo-Hyun, was appointed as chairman.145
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The Basic Act calls for inquiry into the following: (i) the antiJapanese liberation movement before or under the Japanese Occupation, (ii)
the history of overseas Koreans who have maintained the sovereignty of
Korea or enhanced national capability since the Japanese Occupation, (iii)
the unlawful killings of civilians from August 15, 1945, to the Korean War,
(iv) death, injury, and disappearance as a result of unlawful or conspicuously
improper exercises of state authority, such as conduct destructive to
constitutional order, serious human rights violations and cases of fabricated
facts from August 15, 1945, through the period of authoritarian rule, (v)
terror, human rights violations, violence, massacre, and suspicious deaths
committed by those who denied the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea or
were hostile to the Republic of Korea from August 15, 1945, to the period of
authoritarian rule, and (vi) cases for which the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission has recognized the necessity of investigation.146
Subsections (iii) and (iv) provided for in the extension of the 2000 Act
for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and
Providing Compensation for Them and the 2001 Special Act for TruthFinding of Suspicious Deaths. They resulted from liberals’ requests to
broaden the investigative scope of human rights violations by the State.
Subsection (v) stems from conservatives’ requests to include the
investigation of human rights violations committed by North Korean
authorities or pro-North Korean leftist civilian organizations. Thus,
uncovering the truth remains significantly influenced by politics in the
present.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was given a four-year
mandate to initiate investigations on suspicious deaths when a petition is
filed or by its own volition absent a petition.147 It may request relevant
individuals to submit an affidavit and appear for inquiry, and relevant
individuals and authorities to submit pertinent data and materials.148 It may
also conduct a field investigation in the place where the cause of a case has
occurred. 149 It may issue an order of accompaniment to a person who
refuses to appear more than three times without just cause.150
Like the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths,151 the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is neither an investigative nor a
146
147
148
149
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judicial authority. Primarily, administrative fines can be imposed only on
those who make false statements or submit false information, refuse or
evade the Commission’s field investigation, or refuse to follow an order of
accompaniment.152 However, imprisonment may be imposed on those who
submit a false application with the purpose of harming another’s honor or
with the intent to obstruct the activities of the Commission.153 The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission may recommend non-prosecution, lesser
punishment, or pardon for offenders who actively cooperate with its truthfinding efforts, and the relevant state authority shall respect the
recommendation.154 It is noteworthy that the Commission is given a duty to
recommend reconciliation between offenders and victims or their families
based on an offender’s repentance and the victims’ or their families’
forgiveness.155
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission currently is accepting
petitions. It will be able to investigate all the cases that the 2000 Act for
Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement Involvers and Providing
Compensation for Them and the 2001 Special Act for Truth-Finding of
Suspicious Deaths did not or could not cover. In particular, the following
high-profile cases are being reviewed: the case of Cho Yong-Soo, who was
the president of a progressive newspaper, the case of Minjok Ilbo, who was
executed after the coup of May 16, 1961,156 the case of Cho Bong-Ahm, who
was the first Minister of Agriculture under the Rhee Syng-Man government,
was accused of spying for North Korea, and was executed after he received
phenomenal support from the public as a social democrat presidential
candidate of the opposition party in the 1956 presidential election,157 and a
number of unlawful killings of civilians by either the South or North Korean
government or by either pro-South militia or pro-North partisans from
August 15, 1945, to the end of the Korean War. It was reported that 86.7%
of the petitions to the Comission were about such unlawful killing cases.158
152
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Presently, it is too early to anticipate how the activities of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission will go on. The Commission is expected to
face difficult challenges since the Commission’s jurisdiction is very broad,
the incidents in question occurred so long ago, and political parties are likely
to make use of the lustration of the past wrongs for their political aims.
VII. CONCLUSION—CONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE THROUGH LOOKING BACK
TO THE PAST
For nearly a decade, the Korean people have chosen to pursue national
reconciliation and unity through disclosing truths and achieving justice
instead of forgetting the past. With strong pressure from civil society, the
Legislature, the Judiciary, and several committees and commissions have
played their own unique roles to rectify past wrongs and reevaluate the past.
The Korean way of dealing with past wrongs may be summarized as
follows: (1) retroactive criminal sanction is limited to the core perpetrators
who acted under the authoritarian regime; (2) retroactive civil sanction is
given broadly to the victims of the authoritarian rule; (3) the contribution by
past activists for democratization of Korea is officially recognized; (4)
counter-violence by them is leniently examined; (5) even home-grown leftist
movements are embraced despite the current ideological and military tension
between two Koreas; and (6) uncovering past wrongs without criminal
sanction is extended beyond the period of the authoritarian regime to include
the Japanese Occupation and the Korean War.
Illustrating past wrongs has provided for a new political and social
ground on which Korean society can make a new beginning. With the
broader perspective for democracy that has been established by the Special
Acts and decisions that follow, the Korean people will be able to internalize
their belief in democracy and move forward. In this sense, looking back to
their past is a way for Koreans to view and construct their future. To cite
E.H. Carr, history is “a dialogue between the events of the past and
progressively emerging future ends.”159
This process certainly has not been free from political struggle.
Liberals initiated and propelled legislation to achieve the task while
conservatives were passive. Although conservatives have criticized such
activities to rectify past wrongs as politically biased and responsible for
consuming too many social resources, they have come to understand the
Special Acts as necessary to relieve the burdens they carry from the period
of authoritarian rule. This reflects the complicated psychology inherited by
159
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the Korean people from their experience under the old regime. They were
not only victims of the old regime but also passive collaborators or partial
beneficiaries.
However, the Special Acts were forged by agreements between the
liberal and conservative parties. Although each side has advocated
somewhat different methods with differing scopes for rectifying past
wrongs, they have come together in the belief that Korean society needs to
discard the legacy of the authoritarian regime. In this light, the acts are
symbolic statements that officially declare the people’s dissatisfaction with
the authoritarian regime. They are necessary for Koreans to heal old
wounds, and to move beyond their tortured past.

